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Abstract
This study examines the costs and benets of uniform accounting regulation in the
presence of heterogeneous rms who can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uni-
form regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider
problem between lobbying rms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on hetero-
geneous rms. Resolving this trade-o¤, an institutional commitment to uniformity is
socially desirable when rms are su¢ ciently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to
society are large. We show that regulatory intensity for a given rm can be increas-
ing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces
lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions
and their e¤ects on corporate governance and lobbying e¤orts.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether to standardize disclosure regulation is a fundamental and unan-
swered problem in accounting research (Dye and Sunder [2001]; Bertomeu and Cheynel
[2013]). Individualized regulation (IR) allows for tailoring accounting policies to the char-
acteristics of each regulated rm. Yet, for the most part, accounting rules take a uniform
regulation (UR) approach in which, for example, the principles of US GAAP or IFRS are
applied across di¤erent rms and industries.1 Common arguments in favor of UR are that
investors may not understand excessive diversity in standards and that uniformity promotes
comparability (e.g., Ray [2012]). We o¤er an alternative, lesser known benet of uniformity.
Because rms must lobby over the same set of rules, uniform regulations imply that each
lobbyists personally costly lobbying e¤ort benets other lobbyists. Uniformity thus creates
a free-rider problem between lobbyists, and greater uniformity exacerbates this free-riding
problem. Hence, uniform rules are less vulnerable to political inuence and serve to reduce
equilibrium lobbying e¤orts and their social costs.2
In the spirit of Peltzman [1976] and Stigler [1971], and recently Bertomeu and Magee
[2011], we model a regulator that is in charge of disclosure regulation for multiple rms. Each
rm faces an agency problem in that an insider (e.g., a blockholder) can take an action that
benets her while imposing a cost on outsiders (e.g., dispersed investors). As a motivating
example, we focus on asset diversion (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [1997]), which is ine¢ cient
because the cost to outsiders exceeds the insiders benet. Regulation can improve social
welfare by reducing insidersability to divert rm resources for their own gain.
To capture trade-o¤s between UR and IR systems, we include a cost to the regulator of
1The current FASB chairman, Russel Golden, espoused the benets of standards in recent remarks Golden
[2013], stating that standardized nancial reporting in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries helped develop
the nations steel manufacturing capacity.
2In this vein, Representative John Dingell (D-MI) said in reference to the FASB: Their job is to pro-
mulgate accounting standards of high quality that do not favor any particular industry or interest group
and that maintain the credibility of our nancial reporting system. The unparalleled success of the U.S.
capital markets is due in no small part to the high quality of the nancial reporting and accounting standards
promulgated by FASB.(as quoted in Beresford [2001])
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setting di¤erent regulation for di¤erent rms. A higher cost of setting di¤erent regulation
represents a more uniform regulatory environment. In our model, this cost operationalizes
an institutional commitment to common standards, for example in the form of conceptual
statements or the established preferences of standard-setters. Absent lobbying, the regulator
chooses the intensity of regulation to minimize diversion, subject to the costs of regulation.
While expected diversion decreases in regulatory intensity, the direct costs of regulation also
increase in regulatory intensity and, potentially, in regulatory heterogeneity.
In our model, insiders can lobby to weaken disclosure regulation, which enables them to
misreport and divert cash.3 We show how a commitment to uniform regulation can increase
regulatory intensity and social welfare. Specically, more uniform regulation reduces insiders
incentives to lobby the regulator. As a stark example, consider a perfectly uniform regulatory
system. Here, the regulator sets identical regulatory intensities for all rms based only on
aggregate rather than rm-specic lobbying. Therefore, relative to individualized regulation,
each insiders lobbying has a stronger e¤ect on the regulation faced by all other rms but
a weaker impact on the regulation she faces. Because lobbying is individually costly to
insiders, they free-ride on each others e¤orts. This free-rider problem, driven by regulatory
uniformity, hurts insiders but benets society because it reduces insidersincentives to lobby.4
When rms are heterogeneous, which we capture with di¤erences in the magnitude of the
diversion problem across rms, changes in regulatory uniformity have two e¤ects. We term
the rst the convergence e¤ect. It causes the regulatory intensities for the rms to converge
because of the increased cost of heterogeneous regulation to the regulator. A rm with a
3Lobbying has played a central role in securities regulation in particular in the context of accounting
rules where new standards are (tacitly) approved by political bodies. For example, discussions in Coates
[2007] and Gipper, Lombardi, and Skinner [2013] highlight the inuence of political forces on regulation
related to securities law and accounting, including political campaign contributions, the revolving door
(see, e.g., GAO [2011]; POGO [2011]), public persuasion strategies (Condon [2012]), and quid pro quo
arrangements. Similarly, Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen [2009] suggests that managers lobbied
against SOX to maintain insider benets.
4In a similar vein, Rodrik [1986], suggests that industry-wide tari¤s are socially preferable to rm-specic
subsidies because they promote free-riding on rms tari¤-seeking. Although the intuition is similar, our
study focuses on agency conicts between investors and managers rather than problems of under- or over-
production caused by product market distortions.
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higher (lower) regulatory intensity experiences a decrease (increase) in regulatory intensity.
The convergence e¤ect is welfare-reducing because it reects an increasing constraint on the
regulator to target regulations at the average rm rather than at each individual rms opti-
mum. In our setting, the rm with the larger agency problem faces more intense regulation,
and the convergence e¤ect causes its regulatory intensity to decrease.
In addition to the convergence e¤ect, an increase in uniformity increases each insiders
free-riding on the others lobbying, as described above. We term this the free-riding e¤ect. In
contrast to the convergence e¤ect, the free-riding e¤ect reduces the insidersinuence on the
regulator and is, therefore, welfare increasing. For the rm with the smaller agency problem,
convergence and free-riding each imply a higher regulatory intensity. For the rm with the
larger agency problem, convergence reduces regulatory intensity and free-riding increases
it. Which of these two e¤ects dominates depends on how problematic lobbying is in the
economy. The convergence e¤ect dominates if lobbying is prohibitively costly to insiders.
In contrast, the free-riding e¤ect dominates if insiders bear relatively low personal costs for
lobbying.
In an extension to our model, we consider the optimal degree of uniformity from the
perspective of an ex-ante planner (e.g., a legislature) concerned with minimizing the welfare
losses from diversion and the implementation costs borne by the regulator. We show that the
optimal degree of regulatory uniformity from the planners perspective decreases with rm
heterogeneity and increases with the magnitude of the agency problems related to lobbying
and diversion. Additionally, allowing the degree of regulatory uniformity to be endogenously
chosen by the planner changes how agency problems related to lobbying a¤ect equilibrium
regulatory quality.
Within the context of our model, we nd that regulatory uniformity reduces lobbying
activities. This suggests that jurisdictions where lobbying is relatively easy should feature in-
stitutions with high uniformity (and vice-versa). Similarly, jurisdictions with more diversity
in economic activity should feature institutions with low uniformity. These predictions can
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be tested with inter-jurisdictional comparisons and in settings where there is a change in the
degree of uniformity of standards (e.g., exchange mergers). Furthermore, public comment
letters and lobbying expenditures o¤er a setting in which lobbying actions may be partly
observed.
Our results speak to the benets of uniform regulation in a number of settings. These
include settings where regulation can be industry-specic or uniform across industries, where
an economy either has one nancial exchange or multiple exchanges that are regulated
separately, where accounting standards are either domestic (local GAAP) or multinational
(IFRS), and where the auditing environment is characterized by one auditor with a consistent
set of policies or numerous auditors each with their own policies. In each of these settings,
there are benets to allowing entity-specic treatments that address rm heterogeneity and
uniform treatment that promotes free riding and thereby mitigates agency problems.
The foundation for our study is the early literature on regulatory choice in economics
(e.g., Arrow [1950]) and accounting (e.g., Demski [1973, 1974]). Both streams of literature
help explain observed regulatory choices by highlighting how lobbying and regulatory cap-
ture cause regulators to choose non-welfare-maximizing regulations (e.g., Stigler [1971] and
Watts and Zimmerman [1978]). Recent research in this stream of literature has examined
how various institutional features (e.g., voting rules) a¤ect the interaction between special
interest groups and regulators. For example, Bebchuk and Neeman [2010] investigate a model
where di¤erent groups lobby the regulator over the level of investor protection in a perfectly
uniform regulatory regime. Similar to our analysis, Bebchuk and Neeman [2010] assume that
regulation helps to reduce rent seeking activities by insiders. The model in Chung [1999]
features managerial lobbying over accounting regulation, allowing for free riding but focusing
on issues related to whether outsiders can observe managers lobbying. In Bertomeu and
Magee [2014], regulatory outcomes are chosen by a combination of a majoritarian vote by
rms and the standard setters bliss point. There, political pressure need not result in the
investorspreferred regulation but, instead, can lead to cycles of increased regulation and
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sudden deregulation. Finally, Perotti and Volpin [2008] predict that political accountability
of the regulator and investor protections are positively associated. To our knowledge, our
study is the rst to formally capture the e¤ects of uniformity in a model centered on agency
conicts and lobbying.
On the topic of uniform versus individualized standard-setting, Sunder [1988] broadly
discusses the economics and mechanisms of standardization, and Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman
[2009] highlight the compliance costs imposed on heterogeneous rms by the one-size-ts-all
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. One way to impose individualized regulation is to allow rms to choose
from a set of multiple standards devised by competing standard-setters. Mahoney [1997]
and Kahan [1997] discuss arguments for and against federal securities regulation as opposed
to exchanges that compete for listings and volume by using di¤erent regulatory policies.
Similarly, Dye and Sunder [2001] examine arguments for and against allowing US rms to
choose whether to report following US GAAP or IFRS, and Bertomeu and Cheynel [2013]
show that rmsmarket values can be higher when they can choose between competing
reporting standards. Ray [2012] models a setting in which individualized regulation is costly
because it forces outsiders and regulators to adjust to di¤erent types of regulation, leading
to an otherwise avoidable multiplication of costly e¤orts. Our model shows instead that
uniform standards can reduce harmful lobbying by inducing a free-rider problem between
lobbyists.
In our model, disclosure is used as a regulatory solution to the problem of managerial
diversion. Several studies have examined disclosures e¤ect on diversion in settings that ab-
stract from regulatory choices and focus on rm-level governance. In Gao [2013] and Caskey
and Laux [2015], for example, better disclosures reduce a managers ability to divert through
privately benecial overinvestment. In Beyer, Guttman, and Marinovic [2014], a manager
can manipulate the disclosure on which his compensation is based, providing a contractual
connection between disclosure quality and the ability to divert. Armstrong, Guay, and We-
ber [2010] provide an empirically-oriented review of the interaction between disclosure and
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corporate governance. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that the commit-
ment to uniform disclosure regulation can help to alleviate the diversion problem. Another
strand of literature examines optimal standard setting in which the objective is to maximize
social welfare. This literature abstracts away from frictions in the regulatory process such as
lobbying. Friedman, Hughes, and Saouma [2016], for example, examine costs and benets of
mandated reporting biases (e.g., conservatism) in an oligopolist product market and suggest
that biased reporting is warranted because it has positive welfare implications. Chen, Hem-
mer, and Zhang [2007] show that certain disclosure properties can improve risk sharing. Gao,
Sapra, and Xue [2016] show that, to reduce the extent of manipulative behavior, optimal
regulation entails a mixture of principals- and rules-based standards. Our study focuses on
a political friction, lobbying, that inuences regulatory choice.
2 The model
2.1 Model setup
We develop a model of political inuence and investor protection in a capital market, similar
in spirit to Bebchuk and Neeman [2010]. We begin with a baseline model that features a
conict between rm insiders and outsiders that potentially di¤ers across rms, a regulator
who can help mitigate the conicts, and the ability for insiders to inuence the regulator.
There are two rms, denoted by i 2 f1; 2g, and a regulatory agency. The two rms
could also be interpreted as two lobbies, each representing a set of di¤erent rms.5 Firms
are composed of risk-neutral insiders and outsiders and there exists an agency problem
between these two parties. This conict is representative of conicts between managers
and shareholders, shareholders and debtholders, or blockholders and dispersed owners, for
example. While outsiders have a claim on the assets or cash ows of the rm, insiders
have an opportunity to pursue private benets, for example, through diversion of funds or
5We take the two rms (or lobbies) as given, consistent with Grossman and Helpman [1994].
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consumption of perks and slack.6 To x language, we will refer to the personally benecial
action that the insider takes as diversion.
Specically, when the insider diverts funds, she gains Di > 0, but this imposes a cost on
outsiders of Ai = (1 + )Di, where  > 0.7 Insider diversion of funds is therefore socially
ine¢ cient and imposes a net welfare loss of Di > 0. Our assumption of Di > 0 implies that
the insider always prefers to take the personally benecial action.8 Furthermore, we assume
that (i) rm is cash ows, ~xi 2 R, are randomly distributed with a mean of i; (ii) the
insider can divert even if realized cash ows, xi, are negative; and (iii) cash ows are not
contractible. Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that outsiders cannot perfectly infer whether
the insider has diverted funds, and thus cannot write a forcing contract. Assumption (iii) is
made to simplify the exposition, but is not essential for the main intuition.9
We introduce q 2 [0; 1) to parameterize rm heterogeneity. Specically, D1 = D (1  q)
and D2 = D (1 + q), such that D is the average potential diversion in the economy. If q = 0,
the rms are homogeneous. For q > 0, rm 2 faces a larger potential diversion problem than
rm 1, since D2 > D1. For ease of exposition, we refer below to rm 2 as the bad rm and
rm one as the good rm because rm 2 has a (weakly) more severe diversion problem.
Regulation limits the insiders opportunity to divert by requiring the disclosure of asset
values or cash ow realizations. Empirically, for example, Perotti and Volpin [2008] use
accounting standards as a measure of investor protection, consistent with standards helping
protect investors from expropriation. Formally, if the insider is forced to truthfully disclose
6Albuquerue and Wang [2008] assumes that insiders steal cash ows at a personal cost. Shleifer and
Vishny [1997] and [2000] discuss managerial diversion and expropriation of value from investors, noting their
close relation to agency problems and perquisite consumption as outlined in Jensen and Meckling [1976].
Schipper [1981] provides an early explicit reference to asset diversion by highlighting how insiders maximize
their own wealth by diverting rm assets to their private use(p. 87).
7Firms in our model are heterogeneous in the size of the potential diversion, although they are homoge-
neous in the proportional costs of diversion, 1 + .
8We assume the cost, Ai is borne only by the outsiders.
9We require only that cash ows are su¢ ciently random to preclude a contract that forces the insider not
to divert. Technically, our assumptions imply that cash ows to outsiders have non-moving support. In an
earlier version of this paper, we relaxed assumption (iii) and showed that contracting on cash ows allows
the outsiders to mitigate (and for some parameterizations, eliminate) the problems related to diversion and
lobbying.
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cash ows ~xi, then she will not have the opportunity to divert Ai, consume Di, and misreport
net cash ows of ~xi   Ai to outsiders. Specically, we model the intensity of regulation
governing each rm i as the probability i that an insider is unable to divert.10 The insider
can misreport and expropriate value from outsiders with probability (1  i).11
Finally, before the regulator species the regulatory intensities, each insider can exert
e¤ort Bi to lobby the regulator to relax the regulatory intensity for his rm. In the model,
neither outsiders nor insiders can form lobbying groups of any kind. This is consistent with,
for instance, small, disorganized, competitive investors and disparate rms. Insiders and
outsiders also cannot contract on the type of lobbying activity we model, nor can insiders
commit ex ante not to lobby ex post. The inability to contract or commit on this dimension
of inuence seems plausible, as, for example, it would be di¢ cult for arms-length investors to
determine what exact policies managers were promoting in private meetings with regulators,
i.e., whether managers were pursuing benecial trade protections or harmful regulatory slack.
Table 1 shows the timeline.
Table 1: Timeline
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Insiders choose Regulator chooses Insider diversion
lobbying e¤orts regulatory intensities may or may not
Bi i occur
Insiders are risk neutral. To focus on the central tensions in our model, we assume that
insiders have no claims on the rmscash ows, ~xi, and benet only from potential diversion.
Insiders incur a personal cost of lobbying the regulator, c
2
B2i . We interpret the parameter
10For instance, a higher i could represent a regulators more stringent interpretation of existing regulation
(e.g., the SECs interpretations of the Dodd-Frank Act) or legislative actions that adjust existing rules (e.g.,
the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments). As modeled, i also encompasses enforcement, which can have a
signicant inuence on regulatory e¢ cacy (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013]).
11Note that regulation leads to an ex ante probability of truthful disclosure. This is similar to Bertomeu
and Magee [2015], where rms have to reveal all signals below a threshold and withhold all signals above the
threshold, meaning that higher regulatory thresholds increase the ex ante probability of truthful disclosure
because more signal realizations will be disclosed. In our model, an insider has to disclose the rms cash
ows truthfully with probability i, independent of the realization of cash ows. With probability 1   i,
insiders can manipulate the report, claim that the cash ows were lower, and divert the di¤erence.
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c > 0 as reecting the ability of outsiders to e¤ectively monitor and deter insiderslobbying.
A higher value of c reects a less severe insider-outsider agency problem on lobbying that
facilitates the subsequent diversion problem. Each insiders expected utility is given by
Ui = (1  i)Di   c
2
B2i . (1)
With probability (1  i), the insider is able to take the personally benecial action and
consumeDi. Insiders always bear the cost of lobbying because they lobby the regulator before
potential diversion occurs. Outsiders receive (unmodeled) payments net of the (modeled)
costs of insider diversion. The collective expected utility of outsiders in rm i, which is also
equal to the value of the outsidersclaim, is given by Vi = i   (1  i)Ai.
The timeline above implies that when the regulator decides on the regulatory intensity
at t = 2, the costs of lobbying, c
2
B2i , are sunk. The regulator inuences aggregate utility by
using regulation to reduce the expected losses from diversion:
L (1; 2;D1; D2; ) =  D1 (1  1)  D2 (1  2) (2)
The welfare-interested regulator is only concerned about diversion because of the welfare
loss, Di, that it imposes on society.12 This welfare loss occurs with probability (1  i),
for each rm i. The regulator wants to minimize this welfare loss subject to the costs of
regulation.13
12Note that this implies that the regulator would optimally allow insiders to divert when  = 0. In a more
general model, allowing insiders to divert could reduce outsidersex ante investment incentives, leading to a
welfare-destroying under-investment problem.
13Note that c, , and i all capture facets of the regulatory and enforcement environment. We believe
the most direct interpretations of these variables are as follows. First, c captures regulatory corruption and
outsidersability to limit insiderswasteful activities (as c parameterizes the personal cost to the insider of
lobbying in the model). Second,  relates to the protection of property rights (as  parameterizes the loss of
resources conditional on diversion). Finally, i relates closely to disclosure quality and protections against
self-dealing (as i parameterizes the probability that a insider will be able to divert resources, potentially
by misreporting nancial results; see also Djankov et al. [2008]). In our model, i is endogenous, while c
and  are exogenous because we view corruption and property rights protections to be deeper institutional
parameters than rules and enforcement actions related to disclosure quality and self-dealing.
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We model three costs associated with regulation. First, we assume a convex cost of
regulation in and of itself, 1
2
21 +
1
2
22, which avoids bang-bang solutions to the regulatory
choice problem. Second, each insider can inuence the regulator through lobbying activ-
ity Bi, which increases the cost of regulatory intensity by Bii. We refer to the costs
1
2
21 +
1
2
22 + B11 + B22 as implementation costs that capture both compliance costs
imposed on rms and social costs of implementing regulation. Third, we impose costs of reg-
ulatory heterogeneity, k
2
(1   2)2, as heterogeneous regulation plausibly requires greater
care in drafting regulation and increased expenditures in enforcement (e.g., sta¤ costs).
When k = 0, the regulator is free to choose individualized regulation without incurring any
penalty (IR). As k !1, the regulator will set the same regulatory intensity for both rms,
thereby choosing a one-size-ts-all regime (UR). Note that k can be interpreted as a tech-
nical constraint on the regulator or an institutional commitment (for example, a mission
statement) to regulate di¤erent rms in a similar fashion. To capture these alternatives, we
rst model the cost parameter k as exogenous and in Section 3 consider an ex-ante planner
(e.g., a legislative body) that chooses k to minimize the welfare losses and implementation
costs.
Thus, the total cost of regulation is given by
C (1; 2;B1; B2; k) =
1
2
21 +
1
2
22 +B11 +B22 +
k
2
(1   2)2 , (3)
and the regulators expected utility is
UR = L (1; 2;D1; D2; )  C (1; 2;B1; B2; k) . (4)
That is, the regulator chooses the regulatory intensity for both rms to minimize the expected
losses from diversion net of the cost of regulation.
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2.2 The equilibrium
We examine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium dened as follows. In period 2, the
regulator chooses optimal regulatory intensities, f1; 2g to maximize its objective function
in (4), given fB1 ; B2g. In period 1, each insider i chooses Bi to maximize her expected
utility in (1) given rational conjectures about the regulators strategy in period 2 and the
other insiders conjectured optimal choice of Bj .
We solve the equilibrium by backward induction. We begin in period 2, when the reg-
ulator chooses the regulatory intensities. We impose the following two conditions to ensure
interior solutions.
Condition 1 Firmslobbying costs are su¢ ciently high, c > 1

1+k
1+2k
.
Condition 2 Welfare losses from diversion are not too high, D < 1+2k
1+2k+q
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k
 1
.
If c < 1

1+k
1+2k
, then lobbying pushes the optimal regulatory strengths to zero. If D >
1+2k
1+2k+q
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k
 1
, then the regulators interest in inhibiting diversion outweighs the im-
plementation costs and the regulator sets i = 1 for at least one rm. For the remainder of
the paper we assume Conditions 1 and 2 are satised.
The regulators expected utility is concave and has the following rst-order conditions:
Di  Bi   k
 
i   j
  i = 0, (5)
for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. The equations in (5) imply
i =
(1 + k) (Di  Bi) + k (Dj  Bj)
1 + 2k
. (6)
Note that both @i =@Bi and @

i =@Bj are negative, so that more lobbying from either insider
reduces the regulatory intensity for both rms for any k > 0. Higher values of k, i.e., greater
uniformity, imply that an insiders lobbying has a lower e¤ect on the regulatory intensity his
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rm faces, since @2i =(@k@Bi) = (1 + 2k)
 2 > 0. This mitigates the negative e¤ect of Bi on
i . In contrast, the inuence of insider is lobbying on the regulatory intensity of rm j is
increasing in k, since @2i =(@k@Bj) =   (1 + 2k) 2 < 0. In our model, k captures the cost
to the regulator of setting di¤erent regulatory strengths for the two rms. Intuitively, higher
values of k imply that the regulator chooses more similar regulatory intensities for the two
rms, so that one rms lobbying has a greater spillover e¤ect on the regulatory intensity of
the other rm, making the negative e¤ect of Bj on i stronger.
Given the anticipated choice of the regulator, insiders choose their inuence activities to
maximize Ui in (1). Substituting i into Ui and taking the derivative yields the rst-order
conditions. Solving the rst-order conditions14 implies that the optimal Bi are given by
Bi =
1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k
Di. (7)
This shows that higher personal benets of misbehavior, Di, are associated with higher
lobbying e¤orts from insiders, Bi . Furthermore, note that an increase in k decreases both
insiders lobbying e¤orts, @Bi =@k =  1cDi (1 + 2k) 2, which is due to the e¤ect that an
increase in k has on the regulators response to lobbying e¤orts.
The equilibrium in terms of exogenous parameters is shown in the following proposition,
which follows straightforwardly from substituting Bi from (7) into (6) and solving these two
equations for 1 and 

2. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 There is a unique interior equilibrium with i 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g dened
14The rst order conditions are 1+k1+2kDi   cBi = 0. The second order conditions are satised as
d
dBi

1+k
2k+1Di   cBi

=  c < 0.
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by
1 = D

  1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k

1 + 2k   q
1 + 2k
,
2 = D

  1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k

1 + 2k + q
1 + 2k
,
B1 =
1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k
D (1  q) , and
B2 =
1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k
D (1 + q) .
To understand the characteristics of the equilibrium, it is helpful to investigate the equi-
librium regulatory intensities. Note that equation (6) implies that two factors inuence
a rms regulatory intensity: potential losses from diversion and insiderslobbying e¤orts.
More specically, denoting ! = 1
1+2k
, rm is regulatory intensity is a weighted average of
rm is potential loss from diversion and lobbying e¤ort and the average potential loss from
diversion and lobbying e¤ort:
i = ! (Di  Bi ) + (1  !)
 
D   B . (8)
Bi is dened in equation (7) and B
 = (B1 +B

2) =2 =
1
c
1+k
1+2k
D. Under pure IR, the average
diversion and lobbying have no impact (as limk!0 (1  !) = 0), while under pure UR, it is
only the average diversion and lobbying that matter (as limk!1 ! = 0). Note that q 2 [0; 1)
implies that D2  D1 and that 2  1.
The expression for i in equation (8) illustrates three important forces in our model.
First, as lobbying becomes prohibitively costly to insiders, i.e., c ! 1, insiders cease lob-
bying. Absent lobbying, the regulator sets the optimal regulatory strength for rm i as a
weighted average of only the expected loss from diversion for the target rm (with deadweight
loss Di) and the expected loss from diversion for the average rm(with deadweight loss
D).
Second, the degree of uniformity, k, inuences the weights on rm-specic and average
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factors in (8), as ! = 1
1+2k
. Increases in regulatory uniformity increase the regulators weight
on D and B in equation (8) relative to the weight on Di and Bi . Uniformity thus pushes
regulatory qualities toward each other. We call this the convergence e¤ect of regulatory
uniformity. Naturally, the convergence e¤ect pushes the higher (lower) regulatory intensity
down (up). If rms are homogeneous, i.e., q = 0, then D1 = D2 = D, and the convergence
e¤ect is trivial. Absent lobbying (i.e., as c ! 1), 2 decreases and 1 increases with an
increase in k for any q > 0. When rms are homogeneous and cannot lobby, regulatory
uniformity, k, plays no role in our model.
Third, as discussed above, there is an additional e¤ect of regulatory uniformity on each
rms regulatory intensity, via @Bi =@k < 0 and @ B
=@k < 0. This is the free-rider e¤ect
in our model. It reduces both insiders lobbying e¤orts and thereby increases both rms
regulatory intensities, since Bi and B
 both enter negatively in (8).
2.3 Equilibrium characteristics
Corollaries 1-3 present our comparative statics results for the baseline model. Corollary 1
summarizes the e¤ects of changes in the cost of lobbying and the e¢ ciency of diversion.
Corollary 1 Lobbying and the deadweight loss from diversion
(a) As the cost of lobbying, c, increases, (i) the lobbying e¤orts of both insiders decrease
and (ii) the regulatory intensities for both rms increase.
(b) As the proportional deadweight loss from diversion, , increases, (i) the lobbying e¤orts
of both insiders are unchanged and (ii) the regulatory intensities for both rms increase.
Corollary 1 shows that insiders lobby less when their costs of lobbying increase, but their
lobbying e¤orts do not respond directly to the costs their diversion imposes on outsiders.
When insiders lobby less, regulatory intensities increase, and, as a result, the expected value
of the future payouts to investors increases. Note that a change in c only has a direct e¤ect
on the insiders; regulatory intensities are only a¤ected indirectly. Changes in , however,
only have a direct e¤ect on regulatory intensities, an e¤ect which operates through the
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regulators preferences for lower ine¢ ciency regardless of lobbying e¤orts. When  increases,
the regulator is more interested in high regulatory intensity because the deadweight loss from
diversion decreases.
Corollary 2 analyzes the e¤ects of increases in rm heterogeneity and the average potential
diversion from the rms, both of which are operationalized by the amounts that insiders can
divert, D1 and D2. Specically, recall that D1 = D (1  q) and D2 = D (1 + q) such that
average diversion is given by D = D1+D2
2
and heterogeneity is given by q = D2 D1
2D
.
Corollary 2 Firm heterogeneity and average potential diversion
(a) As rms become more heterogeneous (i.e., q increases), (i) the lobbying e¤ort of the
the bad rms insider and the regulatory intensity for the bad rm increase; (ii) the
lobbying e¤ort of the good rms insider and the regulatory intensity for the good rm
decrease; and (iii) total lobbying is unchanged.
(b) As average potential diversion, D, increases, (i) both insiders lobby the regulator more,
and (ii) the regulatory intensities for both rms increase.
Corollary 2 (a) analyzes the e¤ect of increased heterogeneity between rms. First note that
an increase in heterogeneity implies that for rm 2 (1) there is more (less) cash for the
insider to divert and a higher (lower) potential deadweight loss that the regulator would
like to prevent. While the resulting increase in lobbying e¤ort from rm 2s insider acts to
decrease rm 2s regulatory intensity, the increased deadweight loss acts to increase 2. The
latter e¤ect dominates the former such that rm 2s regulatory intensity increases despite
the increased lobbying e¤ort from rm 2s insider. The opposite occurs for rm 1, which
becomes less important to the regulator and whose smaller amount of diversion provides
a weaker motivation to the insider to lobby. The e¤ects of heterogeneity on each rms
lobbying are equal and opposite, implying no net e¤ect of heterogeneity on total lobbying.
Part (b) shows that with an increase in average potential diversion in the economy, both
insiders have more resources available to divert, and thus increase their lobbying e¤orts.
However, since the potential deadweight loss also increases, the regulator is interested in
higher regulatory intensities and, despite the increased lobbying, increases 1 and 

2. If the
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potential for diversion D increases in the rmsrealized or expected cash ows, our model
suggests greater lobbying in macroeconomic expansions than contractions, in contrast to the
prediction in Bertomeu and Magee [2011].
Finally, we analyze the e¤ect of a change in k, which represents the degree of UR relative
to IR. Denote c = 1
2

2 + 1+q
q

and c = 1
2
q+1
q
.15
Corollary 3 Degree of uniformity: As the cost to the regulator of individualized reg-
ulation, k, increases, (i) the lobbying e¤orts of both insiders decrease; (ii) the regulatory
intensity for the good rm increases; (iii) the regulatory intensity for the bad rm decreases
for c > c, rst increases then decreases for c > c > c, and always increases for c < c; and
(iv) the average regulatory intensity increases.
As discussed in the introduction, constraining the regulator to set similar regulatory intensi-
ties for di¤erent rms introduces two e¤ects, the convergence e¤ect and the free-rider e¤ect.
The convergence e¤ect arises because an increase in k makes the regulator more inclined to
apply the same regulatory intensity to both rms. Therefore, 1 and 

2 are set closer to
each other in equilibrium. This e¤ect pushes the higher 2 down and the lower 

1 up. The
free-rider e¤ect occurs because, when the regulator chooses more similar values for 1 and
2, the lobbying e¤orts of rm is insider have a stronger e¤ect on the regulatory intensity
of rm j. This leads to a more intense free-rider problem on insiderslobbying in that each
insider relies more on the other insiders lobbying e¤orts to economize on his own e¤orts.
Insiders therefore reduce their overall lobbying e¤orts, which increases i for both rms.
The net e¤ects of an increase in k on insiderslobbying are unambiguous. So, too, are the
net e¤ects of an increase in k on regulatory intensity for the good rm, as the convergence and
free-rider e¤ects both act to increase 1. However, the net e¤ects of the convergence and free-
rider e¤ects on regulatory strengths for the bad rm are ambiguous. For 2, the convergence
and free-rider e¤ects oppose each other, and either may dominate, yielding implications
for 2 that depend on parameter values. When the agency problem is su¢ ciently severe
(c < c), such that both rms heavily lobby the regulator, the free-rider e¤ect dominates,
15When q = 0, we set cjq=0 = limq!0 c =1 and cjq=0 = limq!0 c =1.
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causing 2 to be increasing in k. When the agency problem is su¢ ciently mild (c > c), the
convergence e¤ect dominates, causing 2 to be decreasing in k. Finally, when the agency
problem has intermediate strength (c > c > c), the free-riding e¤ect dominates for low values
of k, such that d2=dk > 0, but the convergence e¤ect dominates for high values of k, such
that d2=dk < 0.
16 Ultimately, when k approaches innity, the regulator sets 1 = 

2,
irrespective of c. Overall, the free-rider e¤ect and the convergence e¤ect complement each
other for the rm with the lower regulatory intensity and conict with each other for the
rm with the higher regulatory intensity. Given that lobbying for both rms decreases, the
average regulatory intensity increases.
The parameter k reects the extent to which the regulator is bound to apply the same
regulatory intensity to both rms. As capital market equilibria and the regulatory system
likely evolve together, we next analyze the e¤ect of allowing k to be chosen by an ex-ante
planner concerned with minimizing the welfare losses from diversion and the implementation
costs of regulation.
3 The optimal regulatory system
In this section we examine the optimal choice of balance between uniform and individualized
regulation, i.e., the choice of k, from the perspective of an ex-ante planner concerned with
the welfare loss from diversion and the implementation costs of regulation. We interpret k
as a deep institutional parameter that is set for the long run (or ex ante) and is not subject
to lobbying inuence.
We assume that the planner is interested in minimizing the loss from diversion subject to
the costs of implementation.17 While considering implementation costs, we assume that the
16Specically, if c > c, then d2=dk < 0 if and only if k >
1
2

1
(c c)   1

.
17This is similar to maximizing outsidersexpected utility net of the regulators implementation costs. In
a competitive stock market where the outsiders represent marginal investors, the outsiders expected utility,
i   (1  i) (1 + )Di, would be closely related to the stock price. This suggests an interpretation of the
planner as an exchange choosing its degree of uniformity to maximize market capitalization net of regulatory
implementation costs.
17
planner does not consider the direct costs she imposes on the regulator through her choice
of k, which are (k=2) (1   2)2, or the costs that managers personally bear for socially
undesirable lobbying, which are (c=2)B21 + (c=2)B
2
2 .
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The planners objective function is given by
US =   (1  1)D (1  q)  (1  2)D (1 + q)  1
2
 
21 + 
2
2
 B11  B22. (9)
Recall from Proposition 1 that 1 > 0 and 

2 > 0 requires Condition 1 to hold, i.e.,  >
1
c
1+k
1+2k
. We therefore restrict our attention to  > 1
c
such that the regulator will choose
positive 1 and 

2 for any k 2 [0;1), chosen by the planner. The solution is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 When q2 (2c  1)  1  0, the planner chooses a perfectly uniform regula-
tory system, ky !1. When q2 (2c  1)  1 > 0, the planner chooses
ky =
1 + q2 (2  c) + q
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
2 (q2 (2c  1)  1) . (10)
The threshold in Proposition 2 is related to the importance of regulatory uniformity in
improving regulatory intensities and to the cost imposed by uniform regulation. Because the
economic forces that drive the decision to choose a perfectly uniform system (ky ! 1) are
the same forces that lead to an increase in ky, we focus our discussion on the comparative
statics presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 4 The optimal degree of uniformity from the planners perspective, ky, (i) weakly
decreases in insiderspersonal costs of lobbying, c; (ii) weakly decreases in the deadweight
loss from insidersdiversion, ; (iii) is independent of mean rm size, D; and (iv) weakly
decreases in the degree of rm heterogeneity, q.
18Including the costs of heterogeneity imposed on the regulator in the planners objective (mechanically)
decreases the optimal k. We view these not as true economic costs but rather as a modeling device to
represent a commitment to more or less uniform regulation. Including the managerscosts of lobbying in
the planners objective implies that the legislature prefers to make managerial opportunism cheaper, which
seems unreasonable.
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Corollary 4 shows that it is more valuable to constrain the extent to which the regulator can
individualize regulation when lobbying-related agency problems are severe (low c), rms are
similar (low q), or managerial diversion is e¢ cient (low ). Furthermore, these comparative
statics are monotone over the whole parameter range. For example, starting at a high c,
decreases in c rst continuously increase ky. As c decreases further and q2 (2c  1)  1! 0
from above, the optimal regulatory system approaches perfect uniformity, i.e., ky !1. The
rst two results in the corollary directly point to our two main economic forces: while free-
riding on lobbying reduces the impact of the agency problem and makes UR more preferable,
rm heterogeneity makes regulatory heterogeneity and IR more preferable. The third result
is similar in that low values of  push the potential welfare losses from diversion in either
rm towards zero and thus towards each other, implying similar results to low heterogeneity
driven by low q. Mean rm size, D, does not a¤ect the optimal ky, as it is a scaling factor
in the planner and regulators utilities given equilibrium lobbying e¤orts.
The following corollary explores how the equilibrium regulatory strengths, yi , and lobby-
ing e¤orts, Byi , change with changes in the underlying parameters when k
y is endogenously
set by the planner.
Corollary 5 When the planner optimally chooses an interior degree of uniformity (i.e.,
q2 (2c  1)  1 > 0),
(i) the lobbying e¤orts of (a) both insiders decrease in lobbying costs, c; (b) insider 1, By1,
is non-monotonic in rm heterogeneity, q; (c) insider 2, By2, increases in rm hetero-
geneity, q; and (d) both insiders increase in potential diversion, D; and the welfare loss
from diversion, ;
(ii) total lobbying, By1 + B
y
2, is decreasing in lobbying costs, c, and increasing in rm het-
erogeneity, q, potential diversion, D, and the welfare loss from diversion, .
(iii) the regulatory intensity for (a) rm 1, y1, decreases in lobbying costs, c; and rm
heterogeneity, q; (b) rm 2, y2, increases in lobbying costs, c; and rm heterogeneity,
q; and (c) for both rms increase in potential diversion, D; and the welfare loss from
diversion, .
When ky is endogenously chosen by the planner, any change in an exogenous parameter
a¤ects regulatory strength and lobbying e¤orts through two channels. First, they have
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direct e¤ects as indicated in the corollaries in Section 2.3. Second, they have indirect e¤ects
on regulatory strength and lobbying e¤orts through their e¤ects on ky. Taking lobbying
costs as a representative example, an increase in c directly decreases both insiderslobbying
e¤orts and increases both rmsregulatory intensities. However, the optimal ky decreases
when c increases, as lobbying becomes less problematic. The less uniform regulatory system
allows the regulator to respond more strongly to the individual characteristics of each rm.
Even though both lobbying e¤orts decrease, the e¤ect of a reduced ky dominates such that
y1 decreases and 
y
2 increases.
Similarly, the extent of regulatory uniformity decreases when rm heterogeneity, q, in-
creases. The decrease in ky works to increase lobbying e¤orts and to generally decrease
regulatory intensities. (Note that the bad rms regulatory intensity may increase due to
the reduced convergence e¤ect.) Furthermore, the increase in q directly reduces the lobbying
e¤ort of the good rms insider, which causes By1 to be non-monotonic in q. Firm 1s regula-
tory intensity, however, always decreases as the diversion amount gets smaller. In contrast,
for the bad rm, the direct and the indirect e¤ects of q on lobbying reinforce each other such
that By2 increases. However, the regulators interest in reducing the loss from diversion in
rm 2 increases in q such that y2 increases despite the increased lobbying. As shown in part
(ii) of Corollary 5, total lobbying always increases with rm heterogeneity, q, and the welfare
loss from diversion, . In contrast, when uniformity is exogenous, q and  have no net e¤ects
on total lobbying. Specically, when k is exogenous,  has no direct e¤ect on either rms
lobbying, and the e¤ects of changes in heterogeneity on B1 and B2 exactly cancel each other
out. When, instead, k is endogenous, increases in q and  decrease ky, which causes total
lobbying to increase.
Finally, Corollary 4 shows that changes in D have no e¤ect of ky, this implies that the
results from the setting with an exogenous k are unchanged. However, while lobbying e¤orts
were constant in  with a constant degree of uniformity, an increase in  lowers ky such that
both insiderslobbying e¤orts increase in  when k is chosen endogenously by the planner
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as ky. Table 2 lists the comparative statics for the baseline model and the extension with an
endogenous ky.
Table 2: Comparative Static Results
Cells in the table body are directional predictions for d[Col]d[Row] , where Col is the column header variable and
Row is the row header variable. + and   indicate positive and negative directional predictions, respectively.
0 indicates no relation between the variables. +=  indicates non-monotonic predictions that depend on the
values of parameters. Comparative statics are applicable for parameter regions with i ; 
y
i 2 (0; 1); i 2 1; 2.
Exogenous k Endogenous ky
B1 B

2 B

1 +B

2 

1 

2 k
y By1 B
y
2 B
y
1 +B
y
2 
y
1 
y
2
c       + +           +
 0 0 0 + +   + + + + +
q   + 0   +   +=  + +   +
D + + + + + 0 + + + + +
k       + += 
4 Conclusion
Disclosure regulation and interactions between rms or sectors of the economy both have
signicant impacts on capital markets. We investigate the e¤ects of uniform (i.e., one-size-
ts-all) versus individualized (i.e., rm- or industry-specic) regulation in a model where
insiders can lobby the regulatory agency for favorable regulation. Each rm is composed of
an insider who can divert cash ows, where such diversion imposes an ine¢ cient cost on the
rms outsiders. The regulator is charged with limiting the ability of the insiders to divert.
While the regulator is concerned about the welfare e¤ects of regulatory intensity, he can be
inuenced by insiderslobbying.
Our main nding is that a regime with uniform regulation (UR) can enhance welfare by
exacerbating a free-rider problem among insiders who can lobby the regulator for privately
benecial but socially harmful regulatory slack. When rms are not too heterogeneous, this
e¤ect makes UR preferable to individualized regulation (IR). When rms are very di¤erent,
21
however, the benet of UR in reducing lobbying is outweighed by the costs of setting similar
regulatory intensities for heterogeneous rms.
Through analysis of the model, we provide several empirical implications, which we hope
will be helpful in understanding the e¤ects of the regulatory regime on lobbying and the
quality of disclosure regulation. For example, we predict that regulatory regimes will tend
towards uniformity when agency problems between investors and managers are more severe
or when it is less costly for insiders to lobby the regulator.
Our model suggests that lobbying could be more di¢ cult when regulatory standards are
principles-based and apply broadly (even across jurisdictions) as under IFRS, than when
regulatory standards are rules-based and can be tailored rmsand industriesparticular
circumstances, as under US GAAP (Herz [2003]). In line with this interpretation, the IASB
might be in e¤ect more immune to political pressure, as suggested by Canham [2009]. Ze¤
[2002] observes that Swiss CFOs displayed a preference for US GAAP over IFRS in part due
to preparersability to inuence regulatory standards in the U.S. Our comparison of rules-
based GAAP and principles-based IFRS suggests that jurisdictions characterized by weaker
agency problems between insiders and outsiders might be more likely to delay or avoid
transitions from GAAP to IFRS, while jurisdictions with signicant agency problems would
seek out commitments to regulatory uniformity. This may have been one of several reasons
for the delays in US convergence to IFRS, and might also contribute to other countries
delays in adopting IFRS.
Similarly, some of the divergence between code and common law legal systems (see, e.g.,
La Porta et al. [2000]) could relate to uniformity in de facto regulations. In common-law
jurisdictions, judicial rulings establish precedents that apply relatively uniformly, while in
code law systems precedents are not established by judicial rulings. This implies that there
is greater de facto uniformity in common-law jurisdictions, which is consistent with the
stronger legal protections of outside investors and enforcement of these rules in common law
countries relative to code law countries (e.g., La Porta et al. [1998]).
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We generate results in a setting with a single regulator who is potentially constrained
to set uniform regulation. The intuition easily extends to related institutional design prob-
lems, including whether to have a single or multiple accounting standard-setters and the
e¤ects of auditor and nancial exchange mergers.19 In the US, for example, there have been
arguments and movements both in favor of UR, through merging the FASB and IASB or
standards convergence, and in favor of IR, through allowing rms to choose to report under
US GAAP or IFRS. Our results imply that changes in regulatory uniformity have impli-
cations for lobbying and regulatory intensity. Di¤erent auditors or nancial exchanges can
have di¤erent policies regarding disclosure, suggesting that mergers of auditing rms can
also be seen as movements towards uniformity. Mergers of auditors and exchanges can help
reduce managerial inuence over their disclosure policies, which we show can be benecial
overall.
19When comparing settings with a single or multiple regulators (or standard-setters), it is important to
also consider economic forces related to decentralization that we have not included in our model, such as
information asymmetry, goal congruence, and coordination across regulators (e.g., Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv
[1982]).
23
References
Albuquerue, R., and N. Wang. Agency conicts, investment, and asset pricing.The
Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 140.
Armstrong, C. S., W. R. Guay, and J. P. Weber. The role of information and
nancial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting.Journal of Accounting
and Economics 50 (2010): 179234.
Arrow, K. J. A di¢ culty in the concept of social welfare.Journal of Political Economy
(1950): 328346.
Bebchuk, L., and Z. Neeman. Investor protection and interest group politics.Review
of Financial Studies 23 (2010): 10891119.
Beresford, D. R. Congress looks at accounting for business combinations.Accounting
Horizons 15 (2001): 7386.
Bertomeu, J., and E. Cheynel. Toward a positive theory of disclosure regulation: In
search of institutional foundations.The Accounting Review 88 (2013): 789824.
Bertomeu, J., and R. Magee. From low-quality reporting to nancial crises: Politics
of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle.Journal of Accounting and Economics
52 (2011): 209227.
Bertomeu, J., and R. P. Magee. Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure
regulation.Review of Accounting Studies 20 (2014): 775802.
Mandatory disclosure and asymmetry in nancial reporting.Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 59 (2015): 284299.
Beyer, A., I. Guttman, and I. Marinovic. Optimal contracts with performance
manipulation.Journal of Accounting Research 52 (2014): 817847.
Canham, C. IASB resists IFRS political pressure, Accessed at
http://www.theaccountant-online.com/news/iasb-resists-ifrs-political-pressure on June
12, 2015, 2009.
Caskey, J., and V. Laux. Corporate Governance, Accounting Conservatism, and Ma-
nipulation.Management Science, Forthcoming (2015).
Chen, Q., T. Hemmer, and Y. Zhang. On the relation between conservatism in account-
ing standards and incentives for earnings management.Journal of Accounting Research
45 (2007): 541565.
Christensen, H. B., L. Hail, and C. Leuz. Mandatory IFRS reporting and changes
in enforcement.Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (2013): 147177.
Chung, D. The informational e¤ect of corporate lobbying against proposed accounting
standards.Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 12 (1999): 243270.
24
Coates, J. The goals and promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 21 (2007): 91116.
Condon, C. Money funds seen failing in crisis as SEC bows to lobby.Bloomberg On-
line (2012), Accessed at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-01/money-funds-seen-
failing-in-crisis-as-sec-bows-to-lobby.html on November 8, 2012.
Demski, J. S. The general impossibility of normative accounting standards.The Account-
ing Review 48 (1973): 718723.
Choice among nancial reporting alternatives.The Accounting Review 49 (1974):
221232.
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de Silanes, and A. Shleifer. The law and
economics of self-dealing.Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2008): 430465.
Dye, R. A., and S. Sunder. Why not allow FASB and IASB standards to compete in
the US?.Accounting Horizons 15 (2001): 257271.
Friedman, H. L., J. S. Hughes, and R. Saouma. Implications of biased reporting:
conservative and liberal accounting policies in oligopolies.Review of Accounting Studies
21 (2016): 251279.
GAO Securities And Exchange Commission: Existing post-employment controls could
be further strengthened. US Government Accountability O¢ ce (2011), accessed at
http://gao.gov/assets/330/320942.html on November 8, 2012.
Gao, F., J. Wu, and J. Zimmerman. Unintended consequences of granting small rms
exemptions from securities regulation: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.Journal
of Accounting Research 47 (2009): 459506.
Gao, P. A measurement approach to conservatism and earnings management.Journal of
Accounting and Economics 55 (2013): 251268.
Gao, P., H. Sapra, and H. Xue. A Model of Principles-Based vs. Rules-Based Stan-
dards.,Working Paper, NYU Stern and Chicago Booth, 2016.
Gipper, B., B. Lombardi, and D. J. Skinner. The politics of accounting standard-
setting: A review of empirical research,Working paper, 2013.
Golden, R. G. Remarks of FASB Chairman Russell G. Golden at NASBA Conference in
Maui, Hawaii,Accessed at http://www.fasb.org/cs/ on June 12, 2015, 2013.
Grossman, G., and E. Helpman. Protection for sale.American Economic Review 84
(1994): 833850.
Harris, M., C. H. Kriebel, and A. Raviv. Asymmetric information, incentives and
intrarm resource allocation.Management Science 28 (1982): 604620.
25
Herz, R. H. A year of challenge and change for the FASB.Accounting Horizons 17 (2003):
247255.
Hochberg, Y., P. Sapienza, and A. Vissing-Jørgensen. A lobbying approach to
evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.Journal of Accounting Research 47 (2009):
519583.
Jensen, M. C., andW. H. Meckling. Theory of the rm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305360.
Kahan, M. Some problems with stock exchange-based securities regulation.Virginia Law
Review 83 (1997): 15091519.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. Investor protec-
tion and corporate governance.Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000): 327.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. Law and
nance.Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 11131155.
Mahoney, P. The exchange as regulator.Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): 14531500.
Peltzman, S. Toward a more general theory of regulation.Journal of Law and Economics
19 (1976): 211240.
Perotti, E., and P. Volpin. Politics, investor protection and competition,Working
paper, 2008.
POGO Revolving regulators: SEC faces ethics challenges with revolving door.
Project on Government Oversight (2011), accessed at http://www.pogo.org/pogo-
les/reports/nancial-oversight/revolving-regulators/fo-fra-20110513.html on November
8, 2012.
Ray, K. One size ts all? Costs and benets of uniform accounting standards,Working
paper, 2012.
Rodrik, D. Tari¤s, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 21 (1986): 285299.
Schipper, K. Discussion of voluntary corporate disclosure: The case of interim reporting.
Journal of Accounting Research 19 (1981): 8588.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. A survey of corporate governance.The Journal of
Finance 52 (1997): 737783.
Stigler, G. The theory of economic regulation.The Bell Journal of Economics 2 (1971):
321.
Sunder, S. Political economy of accounting standards.Journal of Accounting Literature
7 (1988): 3941.
26
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. Towards a positive theory of the determination
of accounting standards.The Accounting Review 53 (1978): 112134.
Zeff, S. Politicallobbying on proposed standards: A challenge to the IASB.Accounting
Horizons 16 (2002): 4355.
27
Appendix
Proposition 1: The solution to our game is given by the values of four unknowns, Bi and
i for i 2 f1; 2g, that solve a constrained system of four linear equations: either the four
FOCs, (7) and (6); or corner solutions replacing any of the FOCs, such as Bi = 0, i = 0,
or i = 1, for i 2 f1; 2g. For the interior solution, Di > 0 implies Bi > 0. Substituting Bi
from (7) into (6) yields
i =

  1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k

(1 + k)Di + kDj
1 + 2k
. (11)
Since 1 < 

2 implies that 

2 < 1) 1 < 1, we have an interior equilibrium, i.e., i 2 (0; 1),
if and only if
c >
1

1 + k
1 + 2k
, which ensures i > 0 for i 2 f1; 2g , and
D

  1
c
1 + k
1 + 2k

1 +
q
1 + 2k

< 1, which ensures 2 < 1.
The rst inequality, c > 1

1+k
1+2k
, is Condition 1. The second inequality,D
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k
  
1 + q
1+2k

<
1, implies Condition 2. The expressions in Proposition 1 follow directly.
Corollaries 1, 2, and 3: These proofs follow by straightforward di¤erentiation of the
expressions for 1, 

2, B

1 , and B

2 given in Proposition 1. Derivatives are provided in the
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table below, where each cell gives d[Column header]
d[Row header] :
B1 B

2 

1 

2
c   1
c2
1+k
1+2k
D (1  q)   1
c2
1+k
1+2k
D (1 + q) D
 
1 + ky

2k+1 q
c2(2k+1)2
D (1 + k) 2k+1+q
c2(2k+1)2
 0 0 D 2k+1 q
2k+1
D 2k+1+q
2k+1
q  1
c
1+k
1+2k
D 1
c
1+k
1+2k
D   D
1+2k
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k

D
1+2k
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k

D 1
c
1+k
1+2k
D (1  q) 1
c
1+k
1+2k
D (1 + q)
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k

1+2k q
1+2k
 
  1
c
1+k
1+2k

1+2k+q
1+2k
k  D 1 q
c(2k+1)2
 D 1+q
c(2k+1)2
D (1+q(2c 1))(1+2k) 2q
c(1+2k)3
D (1+q 2qc)(1+2k)+2q
c(1+2k)3
For Corollary 3, part (iv), the average regulatory intensity is given by 

1+

2
2
= D c(1+2k) (1+k)
c(1+2k)
,
and the derivative is given by d
dk

1+

2
2

= D 1
c(2k+1)2
> 0. The signs of the derivatives in
the table are immediate, except for d

i
dk
.20 To show Corollary 3, part (ii), we have
d1
dk
=
D
c (1 + 2k)3
((1  q) (1 + 2k)  2q + 2cq (1 + 2k))
>
D
c (1 + 2k)3
((1  q) (1 + 2k)  2q + 2 (1 + k) q)
=
D (2k + 1  q)
c (1 + 2k)3
> 0,
where the rst inequality follows from Condition 1. For Corollary 3, part (iii), the derivative
of 2 with respect to k can be written as
d2
dk
=
2qD
(2k + 1)2

1
2c

2 +
1 + q
q

    2 k
c (2k + 1)

The derivative is always negative when 1
2c

2 + 1+q
q

  < 0, i.e., when c > c = 1
2

2 + 1+q
q

.
20Recall that Condition 1 ensures that   1c 1+k1+2k > 0.
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That is, @

2
@k
< 0 when c is su¢ ciently large. The above derivative is positive when
1
2c

2 +
1 + q
q

    2 k
c (2k + 1)
> 0
, 1
2

2 +
1 + q
q
  2 2k
2k + 1

> c
The term in parentheses ranges from 1+q
q
to 2 + 1+q
q
because 2 2k
(2k+1)
ranges from 0 to 2. This
implies that @

2
@k
> 0 whenever c < c = 1

1+q
2q
, i.e. when c is su¢ ciently small. Finally, for
intermediate values of c, when c > c > c, the derivative is positive for k = 0 and is negative
when k
2k+1
>

1
2c

2 + 1+q
q

  

c
2
, i.e., when k > 1
2

1
(c c)   1

.
Proposition 2: To prove the Proposition, we (I) establish the rst-order condition, which
(II) has three solutions. We then rule out two of the three by showing that (III) one of the
solutions is a local minimum, and (IV) another is negative for feasible parameter values. We
(V) establish a condition for the third solution to be a global maximum. Finally, we (VI)
show that if the condition is violated, the optimum is a corner solution with ky !1.
I. Substituting expressions for i and B

i from (6) and (7) into US in (9) yields,
US = US (

1; 

2; B

1 ; B

2)
= D
 
2D (1 + q2 + 4k (1 + k + q2)) (1 + k   c (1 + 2k))2   4c2 (1 + 2k)4 
2c2 (1 + 2k)4
(12)
and maximizing US with respect to k gives the following FOC:
2D2
1 + q2 + 4k (1 + k + q2 (2 + k))  4ck (1 + 2k) q2
c2 (1 + 2k)5
(c  1 + k (2c  1)) = 0. (13)
30
II. The FOC is satised for k0 = 1 c
2c 1 ,
k+ =
1 + q2 (2  c) +
q
q2
 
2 + q2
 
3  2c+ c22
 2 + q2 ( 2 + 4c) , and
k  =
1 + q2 (2  c) 
q
q2
 
2 + q2
 
3  2c+ c22
 2 + q2 ( 2 + 4c) .
III. It is straightforward to show that k  < 0 for the relevant values of c, q, and  (i.e.,
c > 0,  > 0, and 0  q  1).
IV. k0 > 0 if and only if 1 < 2c  2, but in this range, the SOC,
d2US
dk2
jk=k0 =  2D
2
c2
(1  2c)4  q2 (2c  3) (2c  1)  1 < 0,
is violated, implying that k0, if it is a feasible critical point, gives a local minimum. Further-
more, k0 < 08 > 1
c
.
V. k+  0 if and only if q 2 + 1 < 2c. The SOC is d2US
dk2
jk=k+ < 0, and is satised for
parameters that satisfy q 2+1 < 2c. Therefore, we require the restriction that q 2+1 < 2c,
which cannot be satised as q ! 0. Given this restriction, ky = k+.
VI. When q 2 + 1 > 2c, we do not have an interior solution. We compare limk!0 US
and limk!1 US to determine whether the planner will in this case set a perfectly uniform or
individualized system. We have
lim
k!0
US =
D
  8c2+ 4D (1 + q2) (1  c)2
4c2
, and
lim
k!1
US =
D
  8c2+D (1  2c)2
4c2
,
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Comparing these, we have
lim
k!0
US > lim
k!1
US
, D
  8c2+ 4D (1 + q2) (1  c)2
4c2
>
D
  8c2+D (1  2c)2
4c2
, q2 > 4c  3
4 (c  1)2 (14)
It is algebraically straightforward but tedious to verify that USSjk=k+ is greater than limk!0 US
and limk!1 US when 2c > q
 2 + 1. So, we next combine the condition in (14) with
the condition for not having an interior maximum, q 2 + 1 > 2c, which is equivalent to
(2c  1) 1 > q2 when  > 1
c
. We seek to determine if there are values of q satisfying both
conditions, i.e., if there exist values of q in [0; 1) such that (2c  1) 1 > q2 and q2 > 4c 3
4(c 1)2 .
For existence of such a q, we require
1
(2c  1) >
4c  3
4 (c  1)2
, 4 (c  1)2   (4c  3) (2c  1) > 0
,  c

  1
c

(3c+ 1) > c22, (15)
but (15) contradicts  > 1
c
. So, there is no feasible q that satises both conditions, which
implies that limk!0 US < limk!1 U

S for all relevant parameter values and the planner chooses
ky !1 whenever q 2 + 1 > 2c.
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Corollary 4: The derivatives are given by
dky
dc
=  1
2
q2
q (c (1  q2) + 5q2 + 3) + (3q2 + 1)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
(1  2cq2 + q2)2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
< 0,
dky
d
=  1
2
cq2
q (c (1  q2) + 5q2 + 3) + (3q2 + 1)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
(1  2cq2 + q2)2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
< 0,
dky
dD
= 0, and
dky
dq
=  
2q2 + c2q22 + 1 + q
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2 (c+ 1)
(1  2cq2 + q2)2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
< 0.
Corollary 5: The comparative statics follow from applying the chain rule using the results
from Corollaries 1-4. When applying the chain rule below, we use the following identities:
@Xy
@Y
= dX

dY
for X 2 fBi; igi=1;2 and Y 2 fc; ; q;Dg ; and @X
y
@ky =
dX
dk
for X 2 fBi; igi=1;2.
To facilitate the following computations, we begin by deriving expressions for 1+k
y
1+2ky and 
1 + ky
  
1 + 2ky

and then express two derivatives from Corollary 4 as functions of ky.
First, substituting ky and rearranging terms yields:
1 + ky
1 + 2ky
=
3cq2  1 + q
q
2q2 + q2 (1  c)2 + 2
2q2 + 2cq2+ 2q
q
2q2 + q2 (1  c)2 + 2
, (16)
1 + ky
1 + 2ky
=
1
4
0@3 + c 
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
q
1A , and (17)
 
1 + ky
  
1 + 2ky

= q
q + cq+
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
2 (1  2cq2+ q2)2


3cq2  1 + q
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2

. (18)
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Second, using ky from equation (10) in dk
y
dc
and dk
y
dq
yields
dky
dc
=  q
1 + q2 (3  2c) + 2q
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
( 1 + q2 (3 + 4c))
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
 
1 + ky
  
1 + 2ky

and(19)
dky
dq
=  
q (3 + c) +
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
q (q2 (3 + 4c)  1)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
 
1 + ky
  
1 + 2ky

(20)
In what follows we rst derive the comparative statics for B1 and B2 (numbered items 16),
for B1 +B2 (item 7), and then for 1 and 2 (items 814).
1. dB
y
1
dc
: Using the chain rule and (19) yields
dBy1
dc
=
@By1
@c
+
@By1
@k
dky
dc
=
D (1  q)  1 + ky
c2 (1 + 2ky)
 A1 < 0, (21)
where
A1 =
qc (1 + q2 (3  2c)) +

(1  2cq2  3q2)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2

(q2 (3 + 4c)  1)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
.
The inequality, dB
y
1
dc
< 0, holds because, rst, for k = ky (i.e., when the optimal k is
nite), it has to be the case that q 2+1 < 2c, which implies that (q2 (2c  1)  1) >
0. Second, for the denominator of A1:
 
q2 (3 + 4c)  1   q2 (2c  1)  1 
q2 (3 + 4c)  1   q2 (2c  1)  1  0
2q2 (c+ 2)  0.
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Third, the numerator of A1 is given by
qc
 
1 + q2 (3  2c)+  1  q2 (2c+ 3)q2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
=  qc  q2 (2c  1)  1  2q2   q2 (2c  1)  1 + 4q2q2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
=    q2 (2c  1)  1qc+q2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
+2q2

qc  2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2

The rst term,   (q2 (2c  1)  1)

qc+
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2

, is negative by
our assumption that q 2+1 > 2c. The second term, 2q2

qc  2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2

,
is also negative, as
qc 

2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2

< 0
, (qc)2 < 4  2  1 + q2+ q2 (1  c)2
, 0 < 8  1 + q2+ 3q2 (1  c)2 + q2 (1  c)2   (qc)2
, 0 < 2q2 (c  2)2 + 4q2 + 8 + q2c22.
So, the numerator of A1 is negative and the denominator is positive. As the leading
fraction in (21),
D(1 q)(1+ky)
c2(1+2ky)
, is positive, dB
y
1
dc
< 0.
2. dB
y
2
dc
: Using the chain rule and (19) yields
dBy2
dc
=
D (1 + q)
 
1 + ky

c2 (1 + 2ky)
A1 < 0. (22)
The expression in (22) is negative, because dB
y
2
dc
=
dBy1
dc
 1+q
1 q , and
1+q
1 q > 0.
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3. dB
y
1
dq
: Using the chain rule and (20) yields
dBy1
dq
=
D
 
1 + ky

c (1 + 2ky)
 A2 ? 0, (23)
where
A2 =
(1  q) q (3 + c) + (1  4cq3  3q3)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
q (q2 (3 + 4c)  1)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
.
The leading fraction,
D(1+ky)
c(1+2ky)
, is positive, and A2 is positive (negative) for q = 1=4,
c = 1, and  = 19 ( = 32).
4. dB
y
2
dq
: The chain rule yields
dBy2
dq
=
@By2
@q
+
@By2
@ky
dky
dq
> 0.
The inequality holds because @B
y
2
@q
=
dB2
dq
> 0, @B
y
2
@ky =
dB2
dk
< 0, and dk
y
dq
< 0.
5. dB
y
1
dD
and dB
y
2
dD
: The chain rule yields
dBy1
dD
=
@By1
@D
+
@By1
@ky
dky
dD
> 0 and
dBy2
dD
=
@By2
@D
+
@By2
@ky
dky
dD
> 0,
where @B
y
1
@D
=
dB1
dD
> 0, @B
y
2
@D
=
dB2
dD
> 0, and dk
y
dD
= 0.
6. dB
y
1
d
and dB
y
2
d
: The chain rule yields
dBy1
d
=
@By1
@
+
@By1
@ky
dky
d
> 0 and
dBy2
d
=
@By2
@
+
@By2
@ky
dky
d
> 0,
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where @B
y
1
@
=
@By2
@
=
dB1
d
=
dB2
d
= 0, @B
y
1
@ky =
dB1
dk
< 0, @B
y
2
@ky =
dB2
dk
< 0, and dk
y
d
< 0.
7. From Corollary 5, it is clear that
d[By1+B
y
2]
dc
< 0,
d[By1+B
y
2]
d
> 0, and
d[By1+B
y
2]
dD
> 0. For
d[By1+B
y
2]
dq
, from the chain rule, By1 + B
y
2 =
2D
c
1+ky
1+2ky and
@

1+ky
1+2ky

@ky =   1(1+2ky)2 , we have
d[By1+B
y
2]
dq
=  2D
c
1
(1+2ky)
2
dky
dq
 0, where the inequalities follow from dky
dq
 0 and dky
d
 0
as shown in Corollary 4.
8. d
y
1
dc
: The chain rule yields
dy1
dc
= D
 
1 + ky
  2ky + 1  q
c2 (2ky + 1)2
+
 
D
(1 + q (2c  1))  1 + 2ky  2q
c (1 + 2ky)3
!0@  qky  1 + 2kyq
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
1A .
We substitute ky and rearrange terms to get
dy1
dc
=   D
4qc2
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
 ,
where
 = 2  4q + 3q2   6q3 +  2q3   q2 c+ q3 (c)2 (1  c)
+
 
1  3q + 3q2 + q2 (c)2q2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2.
Next, we reduce the dimensionality and simplify the range of parameters by substitut-
ing c = y + 1, where c > 1) y > 0. We denote the result ty:
ty = 2  4q + 3q2   6q3 +  2q3   q2 (y + 1)  q3 (y + 1)2 y
+
 
1  3q + 3q2 + q2 (y + 1)2p2 (1 + q2) + q2y2
= tyA + tyB + tyC + tyD,
37
where
tyA =  q3y3 + q2y2
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2),
tyB =  2y2q3 + 2yq2
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2),
tyC =  yq2 (1  q) + q (1  q)
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2), and
tyD = 2 (1  2q)
 
q2 + 1

+
 
(1  2q)2 + q2p2 + q2 (2 + y2).
(i) Note that tyA is positive, as
tyA > 0
,

y2q2
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2)
2
>
 
q3y3
2
, 2y4q4  q2 + 1 > 0.
(ii) tyB is positive, as
tyB > 0
,

2q2y
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2)
2
>
 
2y2q3
2
, 8y2q4  q2 + 1 > 0.
(iii) tyC is positive, as
tyC > 0
,

q (1  q)
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2)
2
>
 
yq2 (1  q)2
, 2q2  q2 + 1 (1  q)2 > 0.
(iv) Finally, each term in tyD is weakly positive for q  1=2, such that tyD  0 holds
for q  1=2. This implies that ty > 0 for q 2 (0; 1=2], because each of the components,
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tyA through tyA, is strictly positive and tyD is weakly positive in this range of q. Next,
to show that ty is positive for q 2 (1=2; 1), rewrite ty as
ty = tyA + tyBCD,
where
tyA =  q3y3 + q2y2
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2) and
tyBCD =
 
2yq2 + q (1  q) p2 + q2 (2 + y2)  qy
+2 (1  2q)  q2 + 1+  (2q   1)2 + q2p2 + q2 (2 + y2).
We rst show that the derivative of each part with respect to y is positive when q > 1=2,
which implies that the derivative of ty with respect to y is positive when q > 1=2. This
further implies that ty is minimized when y approaches its lower bound. We then show
that the minimum of ty is positive, which implies that ty is positive everywhere. That
is, rst,
dtyBCD
dty
= q2
y (2q   1)2 + 4q2 + 4 + qy + 4q2y2   (1  q + 4qy)p2 + q2 (2 + y2)p
2 + q2 (2 + y2)
and this term is positive for q > 1=2, as
dtyBCD
dty
> 0
,  y (2q   1)2 + 4q2 + 4 + qy + 4q2y22 >  (1  q + 4qy)2 (2 + q2 (2 + y2))
, 2 (2q + 7q2 + 7 + 4y (2q   1) (3q   1)) (q2 + 1)
+
 
(2q   1)2 + q2 (1  2q + 8q2y + 3q2) y2 > 0.
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Next, we show that dtyA
dy
> 0, which follows as
dtyA
dy
=

4q2 + 3q2y2   3qy
p
2q2 + q2y2 + 2 + 4
 q2yp
2q2 + q2y2 + 2
> 0
, 4q2 + 3q2y2 + 4  3qy
p
2q2 + q2y2 + 2 > 0
,  4q2 + 3q2y2 + 42   3qyp2q2 + q2y2 + 22 > 0
, 2  q2 + 1  8q2 + 3q2y2 + 8 > 0.
Finally, we show that miny ty > 0. Because
dty
dy
> 0, miny ty is achieved at the lower
bound for y, where y > 1 q
2
2q2
follows from q2 (2c  1) 1 > 0 and y = c 1. Therefore,
min
y
ty = lim
y! 1 q2
2q2
ty = q 1
 
q + 2q2 + 1

(1  q) > 0.
That is, ty > 0 holds everywhere. Therefore, d
y
1
dc
< 0, as d
y
1
dc
/  dty
dy
.
9. d
y
2
dc
: The chain rule yields
dy2
dc
=
@y2
@c
+
@y2
@ky
dky
dc
.
As shown in the proof of Corollary (3), the derivative @
y
2
@ky =
d2
dk
is always negative
when
1
2c

2 +
1 + q
q

   < 0, which is equivalent to
q (2c  1)  1 > 0. (24)
The condition in (24) is implied by the condition for interior ky, q2 (2c  1)  1, and
0 < q < 1, as
q (2c  1)  1 > q2 (2c  1)  1.
Therefore, q2 (2c  1)   1 ) q (2c  1)   1 ) @y2
@ky < 0 for the feasible range. Fur-
thermore, @
y
2
@c
=
d2
dc
> 0 and dk
y
dc
< 0, so d
y
2
dc
=
@y2
@c
+
@y2
@ky
dky
dc
is the sum of two positive
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terms in the relevant range, implying d
y
2
dc
> 0.
10. d
y
1
dq
: The chain rule yields
dy1
dq
=
@y1
@q
+
@y1
@ky
dky
dq
< 0.
The inequality holds because @
y
1
@q
=
d1
dq
< 0, @
y
1
@ky =
d1
dk
> 0, and dk
y
dq
< 0.
11. d
y
2
dq
: The chain rule yields
dy2
dq
=
@y2
@q
+
@y2
@ky
dky
dq
> 0.
The inequality holds because @
y
2
@q
=
d2
dq
> 0, @
y
2
@ky =
d2
dk
< 0, and dk
y
dq
< 0, where we
show that @
y
2
@ky < 0 for the relevant range of parameters in the proof of
dy2
dc
> 0.
12. d
y
1
dD
and d
y
2
dD
: The chain rule yields
dy1
dD
=
@y1
@D
+
@y1
@ky
dky
dD
> 0 and
dy2
dD
=
@y2
@D
+
@y2
@ky
dky
dD
> 0.
The inequalities hold because @
y
1
@D
=
d1
dD
> 0, @
y
2
@D
=
d2
dD
> 0, and dk
y
dD
= 0.
13. d
y
1
d
: We can write
dy1
d
=
D
4
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2
,
where
 = 2 + q2 (5 + c (2c  5))  q + qc+ (3  q   2qc)
q
2 (1 + q2) + q2 (1  c)2.
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Next, dene c = y + 1, and y as  after substituting y for c  1:
y =

yq  
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2)
2
+ yq (1  q) + 3 (1  q)
p
2 + q2 (2 + y2).
which is the sum of three positive terms, given y > 0 and 0 < q < 1. Finally,
y > 0)  > 0) dy1
d
> 0.
14. d
y
2
d
: The chain rule yields
dy2
d
=
@y2
@
+
@y2
@ky
dky
d
> 0.
The inequality holds because @
y
2
@
=
d2
d
> 0, @
y
2
@ky =
d2
dk
< 0, and dk
y
d
< 0. We show
that @
y
2
@ky < 0 for the relevant range of parameters in the proof of
dy2
dc
> 0.
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